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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
STOCKHOLDER'S RIGHT TO SUE FOR
WRONGS TO CORPORATION COMMITTED
PRIOR TO HIS ACQUISITION OF STOCK
By JAMES T. KROCK, '23
It is a well-accepted principle of law that a stockholder has,
with certain limitations, a right to sue for transactions against
the corporation. The books are replete with decisions upon this
point based upon the reasoning that stock in a corporation is
personal property and an injury to such property gives rise to a
cause of action. Before discussing the matter at hand it might
be well to review, somewhat, the law upon this subject.
Generally speaking, the primary right to sue rests with the
corporation, that the corporation is the proper party to bring suit
to redress a wrong committed against it.' This is obvious by
reason of the fact that a corporation being a separate, distinct
entity,2 an artificial being constructed by law, owns its property
and is subject to a degree to the same liabilities and has the same
rights as a human person.
However, due to the fact that the mind of the corporation, the
animus contrahendi, if you will, is composed of more than one
person, namely, the directors, officers and stockholders, the human
element crept in and made necessary a modification of the rule.
Cases arose where the incentives of the governing body were
antagonistic to, or to say the least, in conflict, with the rights of
the corporation, for instance, where a rival corporation has
obtained a majority of stock in another corporation, elected a
board of directors of its own choosing and then sought to take
advantage of the other corporation. Certainly the corporation
thus imposed upon would have the right to sue; but the question
is, who would bring the suit?
The law, in its wisdom, has adapted itself to meet this situation
by allowing a suit to be brought, in behalf of the corporation, by
a stockholder. As a prerequisite to the bringing of such an action,
it is necessary for the stockholder to make a demand upon the
corporation3 unless such a demand is shown to be useless or futile.'
Some states hold that a demand upon the directors is sufficient,
Elinergreen vs. Weimer, 138 Wis. 112.
Dousinan vs. The Wisconsin and Lake Superior Mining and Smelting
Co., 40 Wis. 418.
Button vs. Hoffman, 61 Wis. 2o.
Elmergreen vs. Weimer, 138 Wis. 112.
Eschweiler vs. Stowell, 78 Wis. 316.
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while others contend that a demand must also be made upon the
stockholders. It is also generally held that the corporation be
made a party defendant to the suit.3
In thus working out the problem the courts have proceeded on
the theory that actions by the corporation are actions resting
primarily on the fundamental right to redress a wrong and as such,
are cognizable at law.5 In allowing a stockholder to sue, the
decisions rest upon the equitable principle that "equity regards as
done that which ought to be done." So where wrongs have been
done to the corporation the right to sue rests primarily with the
corporation in a suit at law, whereas, when the corporation refuses
to act and the stockholder sues the action is in equity.6 Further-
more, where there is a wrong which peculiarly affects the stock-
holder, where it is a wrong to himself personally apart from the
wrong to the corporation, equity allows the stockholder to bring
an action and allows him to bring it also in behalf of all others
similarly situated.6
Thus we are brought to the crux of the situation, to the precise
question involved in this article, namely, "Where a stockholder
acquires stock subsequent to the time when the transactions com-
plained of were committed, may he sue because of such wrongs ?"
This is a debatable question, one which has perplexed the courts
of various states and courts of federal jurisdiction. The courts of
the United States have settled it in one way, which decisions some
state courts have followed as precedent while by others they have
been rejected. The supreme court of Wisconsin has never been
called upon to decide the question. It is not for us to decide or to
settle that which has puzzled the minds of some of the greatest
justices; but we can review the authorities and there see before us
the combined effect and the reasoning that caused it, from which
we can draw our own conclusions.
Although the number of decisions upon this point is compara-
tively small, nevertheless it will be found that there is a clean-cut
division in the authorities. On the one hand are found the
decisions of the federal courts with the decisions of the state
courts which have followed the federal rule; on the other, the
decisions of the state courts which have refused to follow the
Converse vs. United Shoe Mchy. Co., 185 Mass. 422, 70 N. E. 444.
6 Dousinan vs. The Wisconsin and Lake Superior Mining and Smelting
Co., 40 Wis. 418.
Converse vs. United Shoe Mchy. Co., 2o9 Mass. 539, 95 N. E. 929.
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federal rule. Wisconsin, as has been said before, has not ruled
upon the question.
The point was first raised in the United States Supreme Court
in the case of Hawcs vs. Oakland.7  In that case the plaintiff
was a stockholder in the Contra Costa Waterworks Co., a Cal-
ifornia corporation. The plaintiff was a citizen of New York
and he brought a bill in equity in behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, against the company, the directors, and the
City of Oakland to correct an alleged injury and to obtain relief
therefrom. The complaint did not state that the plaintiff owned
stock prior to the time the alleged acts were committed, but
alleged that the company was furnishing the city with water
beyond what the law required and that the directors, even after
the plaintiff requested that it be not done, continued so to do to
the injury of himself, other shareholders and the company. The
lower court dismissed the bill and upon appeal the decision was
affirmed, the higher court holding that no wrongful acts were
shown and that the directors in California were better able to
judge of affairs than was a citizen of New York. The court laid
down several principles among which is the one that is the start-
ing point for all of the law upon this subject, viz., "To enable
a stockholder in a corporation to sustain in a court of equity in his
own name, a suit founded on a right of action existing in the
corporation, and in which the corporation itself is the appropriate
plaintiff, there must exist as the foundation of the suit . . . an
allegation that complainant was a shareholder at the time of the
transactions of which he complains, or that his shares have
devolved upon him by operation of law."
Immediately after handing down this decision the United
States Supreme Court promulgated an additional equity rule,"
now Rule No. 27, which is as follows:
Every bill brought by one or more stockholders in a corporation, against
a corporation and other parties, founded on rights which may properly
be asserted by the corporation, must be verified by oath and must con-
tain an allegation that the plaintiff was a shareholder at the time of the
transaction of which he complains, or that his share had devolved on him
since by operation of law, and that the suit is not a collusive one to confer
on a court of the United States, jurisdiction of a case of which it would.
not otherwise have cognizance. It must also set forth with particularity
the efforts of the plaintiff to secure such action as he desires on the part
7 104 U. S. 450.
" Rule No. 94.
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of the managing directors or trustees, and, if necessary, of the share-
holders and the causes of his failure to obtain such action, or the reasons
for not making such effort.
The case of Dimpfel vs. Ohio, etc., Railroad Co. 9 was decided
on the authority of Hawes vs. Oakland and Mr. Justice Fields
quotes from that case at some length. However, the Dimpfel
case was decided, not so much on the point of whether or not the
stockholders had a right to sue for acts done before they acquired
stock, as it was on the point of estoppel in that they had waited
three years and eight months before suing. Then too, the court
dwells on the point that the complainants owned but fifteen
hundred of a total of two hundred and forty thousand shares.
The case of Taylor vs. Holmes ° followed the Hawes vs. Oakland
and the Dimpfel case, cited ante, but did not vary the stand of
the United States Supreme Court. However, these three cases
together with equity Rule 94 are the sources of whatever law there
is in favor of not allowing a subsequent shareholder to sue for
acts committed before he acquired his stock.
The courts of Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Nebraska,
and Pennsylvania have followed the lead of the United States
Supreme Court, while the courts of Alabama, Idaho, Maine,
Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, and New York take the
view that in order to sue for acts committed prior to his acquisition
of stock a stockholder need not show that he held stock at or
before such time.
The Colorado supreme court in the case of Boldenbeck vs.
Bullis" held that where a plaintiff stockholder had acquired his
stock subsequent to a meeting of stockholders at which meeting
the acts complained of were authorized, it appearing that the
stock which he afterward purchased had participated in voting
in favor of the authorization, such stockholder could not maintain
the suit. The court cites Hawes vs. Oakland and other federal
decisions; but it is easily to be seen that the decision rests mainly
on estoppel.
In Georgia, in the case of Alexander vs. Searcy,12 the main
reason for the decision was that in waiting for from seven to
fifteen years before bringing action for mismanagement the
stockholder was estopped from bringing suit. The idea that
he did not own stock at the time of the injury was supplementary
aI0 U. S. 209.
10 127 U. S. 489.
40 Colo. 253, 90 Pac. 634.
"81 Ga. 536, 8 S. E. 63o.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
and although the court cites the federal rule with approval it
nevertheless grounds its decision in an estopped in pais.
There is some law in Indiana on this point which is found in the
case of Tevis vs. Hammersmith.3 In that case the complaint
was attacked upon several grounds, one of which was that it was
not stated therein that plaintiff owned the stock at the time of the
alleged acts. The upper court held the complaint valid without
touching upon this point. Upon a rehearing 14 the court held that
the complaint sufficiently averred ownership at the time of the acts.
In its decision the court very briefly discusses the form of the
complaint and does not go into the reasoning of the proposition
in which we are interested. So it is by mere inference only that
Indiana lines up with the federal rule and holds that a stockholder
must aver that he owned stock at the time of the acts of which he
complains.
Iowa too, follows the federal rule in the case of Clark vs.
American Coal Co.15 The court quoted verbatim from the case
of Dimpfel vs. Railway Co., before cited; but in this Iowa case
also there were other grounds for the decision and the reasoning
upon our proposition is not of very great strength. Nebraska
likewise follows this rule in the case of Home Fire Insurance Co.
vs. Barber 6 but in that case the plaintiffs bad bought their stock
from the defendant and now sought to hold the defendant for
wrongs to the corporation, and this decision, like some of the
others, rests on an estoppel.
By far the strongest of the state court decisions following the
federal rule is found in Pennsylvania in the case of Wolf vs.
Shortridge. This was an action for an accounting between the
years of 187o and 1896. The plaintiff had acquired his stock
in 1892, 1893 and 1894. A demurrer to the complaint was
sustained with leave to amend which was done so as to cover the
years of 1894 to 1896. A demurrer to the amended complaint
was overruled and judgment was given for the plaintiff when the
defendant failed to answer over. On the defendant's appeal
the court in reversing the judgment said, "The bill is radically
defective. . . . Secondly, the plaintiff in February, 1892, bought
stock in the lessor company and made further purchases in 1893
and 1894. He did not file his bill until 1898 and then he demanded
13 31 Ind. A. 281, 66 N. E. 79.
"* 67 N. E. 912.
86 Iowa 436, 53 N. W. 291.
"67 Neb. 644, 93 N. W. 1024.
1 I95 Pa. 91, 45 AtI. 936.
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an accounting back to 187o. The date was subsequently amended
so as to begin in 1894, but the original demand is significant of
the reckless disregard of important facts with which the whole bill
is framed. His excuse, that he did not know of the matters
complained of until 1894, is, under the circumstances, altogether
too vague. He practically admits he has no real knowledge now.
The management he attacks is prima facie in entire compliance
with the agreement . . . the bill might well have been dismissed
for laches." After this tirade the court goes on, "But thirdly,
passing by the subordinate questions of parties and delay of seek-
ing relief, the bill has no substantial foundation of fact to rest
upon... ." Thus it is seen that the question of the acquirement
of his stock subsequent to the alleged transactions was only a
part of the foundation, a subordinate part as is stated by the court.
On the other hand the state courts which hold that a stockholder
may sue for transactions occuring prior to the time when he
acquired his stock are all based upon the theory that the federal
rule as laid down by the court in the case of Hawes vs. Oakland,
cited ante, followed by Rule 94 and adhered to ever since by our
highest court, is a rule of practice merely, and not a general
principle of law; and as such the state courts are not bound to
follow it. This is the stand taken in the states of Alabama,18
Maine,19 Michigan,"0 Montana,21 New Hampshire,22 New York23
and Idaho.2 '
The case of Just vs. Idaho Canal Co. 5 is perhaps the clearest
and best reasoned case on the side of those advocating the right
of a subsequent stockholder to sue and is representative to a
degree of the stand taken in the states just named. In that case
which was an action to collect a sum alleged to be due on a
contract prosecuted by a stockholder for the use and benefit of the
corporation, it was shown that the plaintiff's corporation and a
competing corporation entered into a contract whereby a debt
became owing to the plaintiff's corporation.
18Monqomnery Light Co. vs. Lahey, 121 Ala. 131, 25 South. loo6; Par-
sons vs. Joseph, 92 Aia. 403, 8 South. 788.
Mason vs. Carrothers, O5 Me. 392, 74 Atl. 1O3O.
Negaunee German Corporation vs. Negaunee German Aid Society, i72
Mich., 65o, 138 N. W. 343.
Forrester vs. Boston, etc., Co., 21 Mont. 544 at 565, 55 Pac. 229 and
353.
Winsor vs. Bailey, 55 N. H. 218.
Pollitz vs. Gould, 2o2 N. Y. ii.
JIust vs. Idaho Canal Co., 16 Idaho 639, 102 Pac. 381.
= 16 Idaho, 639, io2 Pac. 381.
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The rival corporation obtained control of the plaintiff's corpora-
tion, elected a board of directors who thereafter refused to prose-
cute an action to collect the debt although requested so to do. The
rival corporation demurred to the stockholder's complaint on the
ground that one who acquires stock subsequent to injurious acts
is not in a position to maintain an action based upon such acts.
In support of this contention they cited federal cases heretofore
discussed. The demurrer to the complaint was overruled and the
defendant appealed. In affirming the lower court's decision, the
Idaho Supreme Court, citing the decisions in the federal courts
to the effect that the complaint must aver that the plaintiff
acquired his stock previous to the time of the alleged transactionS,
said, "This is undoubtedly the rule in the federal courts; but it is
a rule that has been adopted for the purpose of preventing a
transfer of stock to a nonresident in order to enable him to bring
the case in the federal courts. It is a rule of practice instead
of a principle of law and is not applicable in the state courts."
Further along in the same decision the court, quoting from
Moraweta on Corporations, Section 265, says, "A shareholder
has an interest irl all causes of action belonging to the corporation
whether they arose before or after he purchased his shares. If
the courts decline to protect this interest in any particular case
their refusal must be based upon some principle of public policy,
or the personal disqualification of the plaintiff." Then the court
goes on to lay down the rule that a stockholder who pleads a
good cause of action may maintain the same even though he was
not an owner of stock at the time the breach of duty occurred,
except in cases where it is shown that he purchased the stock
with the intent and for the purpose of bringing suit, or where his
vendor was for some reason estopped from maintaining the action
and the purchaser had notice of such bar.
It is not within the purpose of this article to discuss at length
the doctrine of stare decisis; sufficient is it to say that the state
courts are not bound to follow as binding precedents, the rules of
practice of the United States Supreme Court. That the rule as to
suits by subsequent stockholders is a mere rule of practice is
recognized by the United States Supreme Court in the decision of
the case of Corbus vs. Alaska Co, 26 where it is said in speaking
of the case of Hawes vs. Oakland cited ante, "The frequency
with which the most ordinary and usual chancery remedies are
187 U. S. 455.
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sought in the federal courts by a single stockholder who possesses
the requisite of citizenship in cases where the corporation whose
rights are to be enforced cannot sue in those courts, seems to
justify a consideration of the grounds on which that case (Hawes
vs. Oakland) was decided; and of the just limitation of the
exercise of those principles"; and the court goes on to uphold
that case. To a like effect is the case of Delaware and Hudson Co.
vs. Albany and Susquehanna R. R. Co.,2T where the court says,
"The purpose of Rule No. 94 hardly needs explanation. It is
intended to secure the Federal Courts from imposition upon their
jurisdiction. ."
Thus we come to the question: Where will Wisconsin stand
on this proposition? Will it follow the lead of the United States
Supreme Court as did Pennsylvania and some other courts and
hold that a stockholder must have acquired his stock prior to the
acts complained of; or will our supreme court, following New
York, Idaho, and the other state courts which have met this
problem, hold that a stockholder's interest in all of the corpora-
tion's causes of action gives him a right to sue for acts committed
against the corporation prior to the time of his acquisition of
stock?
Although it is the purpose of this article to set forth the
authorities upon both sides of this question, nevertheless it does
seem to the writer, that in view of Section 1753 of the Wisconsin
Statutes which provides that, "No corporation shall issue any
stock or certificate of stock except in consideration of money
or of labor or property estimated at its true money value, actually
received by it, equal to the par value thereof. . ." certainly a
person receiving stock from the corporation, since he has to pay
one hundred cents on the dollar for it, should be allowed, if he
has no ulterior motive, to maintain suit for wrongs committed
previous to his acquisition of stock. And further, it would seem to
the writer that where a stockholder has purchased his shares
from another, since he becomes interested in every phase of the
corporation's welfare, a partaker in its liabilities as well as in its
profits, he should be allowed to maintain an action to redress the
wrongs to such corporation even though they occurred prior to
the time when he acquired stock, always provided he is actuated
by proper motives.
2r 213 U. S. 435 at 446.
